LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT AND THE LAW
L. C. Green
The term low-intensity conflict is relatively new in military and
political language and is employed more or less synonymously with noninternational conflict, especially when such a conflict becomes of
international concern. The rubric non-international conflict itself is a
refined term for what were formerly known as revolutions or civil wars,
particularly when these have developed into major operations with the
likelihood or reality of atrocities being committed against non-combatants,
whether civilians or those hors de combat, a fact that is often more
common in non-international than international conflicts, especially when
ideological, ethnic, or religious differences are in issue. It is for this
reason that it must be borne in mind that the term low-intensity has no
relation to the severity or violence of the conflict. It is a term used to
indicate that the conflict is not between recognized states nor that any
major power is directly involved.
According to the classical writers and generally accepted
customary international law these conflicts were outside the purview of
international law since they were regarded as being totally within the
domestic jurisdiction of the state in which they were being waged.
Nevertheless, even Grotius, who regarded war as being limited to an
engagement between sovereign states by way of their armed forces,'
conceded that if an over-mighty prince so ill-treated his subjects that they
were compelled to rise up against his rule, other princes had a legal right,
and perhaps were even under a duty, to come to the assistance of those
2
subjects and even displace the prince against whom they were revolting.
It must be recognized, however, that such intervention might well be little
more than a cover for predatory activity by the savior, intent upon adding
the territory in question to his own. Even so, it was generally considered
that such intervention could only take place in the most exceptional of
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circumstances since, as indicated by Vattel, 3 all states were equal,
regardless of their size, so that no prince possessed jurisdiction over the
acts of another.
It was not only classical writers who recognized that in extreme
circumstances intervention might be legitimate when all humanitarian
principles as then understood were being infringed. In the Middle Ages,
princes were issuing codes of conduct for the behavior of their soldiery
even though, to a very great extent, the campaigns in which they were
involved were internal and dynastic rather than international. Thus, as
early as 1385 Richard II of England issued orders concerning the rights of
justice of commanders over their own men,' and by the fifteenth century
such military codes tended to forbid pillage and the destruction of private
property as well as postulating respect for monasteries and priests, women,
children, the infirm, and others, and had developed sufficiently even for
6
Shakespeare to have Fluellen, in Henry V, refer to a law of armes.
It is often said that the first war crimes trial was that conducted by
representatives of a group of Hanseatic cities against Peter of Hagenbach
at Breisach in 1474.1 In fact, the conflict in which Hagenbach's offenses
were committed was a non-international conflict waged by some of the
inhabitants of territory controlled by the Count of Anjou who were seeking
their independence. In the course of suppressing their revolt, Hagenbach
committed a number of atrocities which would now be classified as crimes
against humanity and which the tribunal condemned as contrary to the laws
of man and of God.
What may be described as the first modern statement providing a
code of law for the behavior of the military was drawn up by Professor
Lieber of Columbia College and promulgated by President Lincoln for the
Government of Armies of the United States in the Field, 1863,1 which was
to a great extent the outcome of his concerns during the Civil War:
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Ever since the beginning of our present War, it has
appeared clearer and clearer to me, that the President
ought to issue a set of rules and definitions providing for
the most urgent cases, occurring under the Laws and
Usages of War, and on which our Articles of War are
silent. 9
While the Lieber Code is intended to apply to American forces
whenever and wherever they may be engaged, it has been pointed out that
The first section of the Code [Arts. 1-30, 'Martial Law,
Military Jurisdiction, Military Necessity, Retaliation']
appears on the whole to be ill organized and less
convincing than it might have been had Lieber followed
the plan of organization he had used in his previous
lectures and writings. The sources of this section of the
Code are, however, unmistakable - a quarter century of
Lieber's thought modified to some degree in the light of
the practice of the United States, particularly as concerned
military occupation and relationships with the Confederate
forces during the Civil War.,
It is not necessary to specify the conduct which Lieber considered
to be contrary to the law of war, nor the fact that his hope that it would
form the basis for similar codes to be adopted by the European powers"
soon came to fruition.' 2 What is important is that it was applied during the
Civil War and enforced against those guilty of breaches. Perhaps the most
significant instance of enforcement of the law during this particular noninternational conflict was the trial of Wirz in 1865. ' 1 The charges against
him were similar to those later brought against the Nazi war criminals at
the end of World War II, and arose out of atrocities committed allegedly
on his orders or as a result of orders conveyed by him against Northern
prisoners. Already in this conflict we see a military tribunal guided by its
Judge Advocate to apply the rules concerning superior orders and

9.
Letter to General Halleck, Nov. 13, 1862, in Baxter, "The First Modem Codification
of the Law of War," 3 INT'L REV. RED X 1963, No. 25, 171 (offprint, p. 12), (quoting FRANCIS
LIEBER FRIEDEL, NINETEENTH CENTURY LIBERAL 331 (1947)).
10. BAXTER, supra note 9, at 23.
11.
(1908).

Letter to General Halleck, in THOMAS E. HOLLAND, THE LAWS OF WAR ON LAND 72

12. Id. at 72-73.
13. H.R. EXEC. Doc. No. 23, 40th Cong., 2d Sess. (1867).

496

ILSA Journal of Int'l & ComparativeLaw

[Vol. 3:493

command responsibility which were later established in relation to an
international conflict:
With what detestation must civilized nations regard that
government whose conduct has been such as characterized
by this pretended confederacy.
An ordinary
comprehension of natural right, the faintest desire to act on
principles of common justice, would have dictated some
humane action, would have extorted from some official a
recognition of international rules of conduct . . . . It was
not . . . ignorance of the law; it was the intrinsic
wickedness of a few desperate leaders, seconded by
mercenary and heartless monsters, of whom the prisoner
before you is a fair type . . . . It is urged that during all
this time [Wirz] was under General Winder's' 4 orders . . .
15

A superior officer cannot order a subordinate to do an
illegal act, and if a subordinate obeys such an order and
disastrous consequences result then both the superior and
the subordinate must answer for it. General Winder could
no more command the prisoner to violate the laws of war
than could the prisoner do so without orders.
The
conclusion is plain, that where such orders exist both are
guilty ....
Strongly as it may strike you that strict justice
would require the punishment of the arch-conspirator
himself ... you cannot stop the course of justice or refuse
to brand [the accused's] guilt as the law and evidence
direct ....
[The accused] executed the bloody work with
an industry which was almost superhuman and with a
merriment which would have shamed a demon ....
There could be no collision where the subordinate was
only anxious to surpass an incomparable superior ....
If
[the accused] still answer that, admitting the facts charged,
he did these things in the exercise of authority lawfully
14

Winder was Provost Marshal of the Confederacy.

15. See, e.g., L.C. GREEN, SUPERIOR ORDERS IN NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL LAW
(1976); Command Responsibility in International Humanitarian Law, 5 TRANSNAT'L L. &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 319 (1995); Y. DINSTEIN, THE DEFENCE OF 'OBEDIENCE TO SUPERIOR
ORDERS' IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (1965); NiCO KAIJZER, MILITARY OBEDIENCE (1978).
16. He had apparently stated that he would "dance on the grave of every Yankee."
v. Mcnamara, 1 Term Rep. 536 (1779).

Wall

Green

1997]
conferred upon him ....

Lord Mansfield ....

497

I answer him in the language of

'7

In trying the acts done by military officers in the exercise
of their duty . . . great latitude ought to be allowed, and
they ought not to suffer for a slip of form, if their intention
appears, by the evidence to have been upright ....
[T]he
principal inquiry to be made . . . is, how the heart stood,
and if there appears to be nothing wrong'8 there, great
latitude will be allowed for misapprehension or mistake.
But if the heart is wrong, if cruelty, malice, and
oppression appear to have occasioned or aggravated the
imprisonment, or other injury complained of, they shall
not cover themselves with the thin veil of legal forms, or
escape, under the cover of a justification the most
technically regular, from that punishment which it is your
province and your duty to inflict on so scandalous an abuse
of public trust. 9
In fact, the tribunal decided that the crimes alleged against Wirz
were so outrageous that a pardon which had apparently been extended to
him was considered to be null and void. This decision indicates that as
early as the American Civil War it was recognized that the laws and
customs of war, derived from the Lieber Code and the generally accepted
rules relating to armed conflict going back to feudal times,2 were
applicable in a non-international conflict and could be used to punish
offenses considered unacceptable by a civilized force.
While accepting that they had no right to intervene in civil wars,
third states claimed the right to secure observance of the law even during a
non-international conflict when their own interests were damaged. Thus,
during the Spanish Civil War a number of European and Mediterranean
Powers adopted the Nyon Agreement 2' directed against unknown
submarines which were attacking merchant vessels legitimately trading
with the Spanish government. In this case the law was enforced not
17.
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against the parties to the conflict, but the officially unidentified powers
whose vessels were indulging in these unlawful attacks against neutral
shipping.
Perhaps the first attempt to provide an international instrument
with relevance to non-international conflicts was the Genocide Convention
of 1948.22 This created a new crime in international law, that is to say an
offense defined by international law, imposing an obligation upon the
parties to enact legislation for its prevention and punishment.
Genocide embraces a number of specified acts intended to destroy,
in whole or in part, a national, ethnic, racialor religious group, as such,
and may be committed in both peace and war. While during an
international conflict the intent of each belligerent is to destroy or disable
as many of the personnel of the adverse part as possible, because they are
personnel of that party and thus an identifiable group, the fact that an
international conflict is involved tends to render this type of destruction
lawful, provided the generality of the laws and customs of war are
observed. In a non-international conflict, particularly as experienced since
1945, there is often evidence of atrocities intentionally directed against a
national, ethnic, racial or religious group, as such, and the conflict in the
former Yugoslavia with its ethnic cleansing is a clear example of this in
operation.
Unfortunately, the method of enforcement envisaged by the
Convention is somewhat ineffective. Genocide is not a crime that is
capable of being committed by an individual acting on his own. Since it is
directed at an identifiable group, it is almost certainly to be carried out as
part of state policy and this is where the difficulty becomes evident. Until
such time as there is an international tribunal with jurisdiction over this
offense, it is punishable only in the courts of the state in which it has been
committed.Y To the extent that it is state policy, it is unlikely that the local
authorities will be prepared to take the steps necessary to try and punish
those of its leaders who have instituted the policy. In so far as it has been
committed during a non-international conflict, trials may well be instituted
by the government of those of its opponents who have committed this
crime, or by the revolutionary authority if it should capture governmental
representatives responsible or, more likely, if it has succeeded in its
endeavors, in which case it is likely to try the former rulers for any
number of offenses which they may well describe as genocide.
More directly concerned with providing legal principles to operate
during non-international conflicts are the 1949 Geneva Conventions
22. G.A. Res. 260 (III); Schindler and Toman, supra note8, at 231.
23.
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relating to humanitarian law during war.2 Article 2 common to the four
Conventions makes it clear that they are intended for inter-state situations.
However, there is a new principle introduced by Article 3, which is to be
found equally in each of the Convention. By this, in the event
of an armed conflict not of an international character
occurring in the territory of one of the High Contracting
Parties, each Party to the conflict shall be bound to apply,
as a minimum . . . [to] persons taking no part in the
hostilities, including members of armed forces who have
laid down their arms and those placed hors de combat by
sickness, wounds, detention, or any other cause
[certain minimum rights to ensure that they] shall in all
circumstances be treated humanely, without any adverse
distinction founded on race, color, religion or faith, sex,
birth or wealth, or any other similar criteria.
The four Conventions include an obligation for parties to inform
each other of the laws they adopt to ensure their application, while those
on prisoners of war and civilians impose a further obligation "to provide
penal sanctions for persons committing, or ordering to be committed, any
of the grave breaches" defined therein. However, the definition of grave
breaches does not overlap the minimal rights detailed in Article 3. But to
the extent that there is such overlap, it might be contended that, even in a
non-international conflict in the territory of one of the contracting parties,
the legislation would operate to penalize such breaches. It must be noted,
however, that Article 3 makes it clear that its provisions "shall not affect
the legal status of the Parties to the conflict." This means that the
governing authority of the territory concerned retains the right to treat its
opponents as traitors or terrorists and subject them to the full rigors of the
law as established in national legislation, even though this might be less
than envisaged in Article 3.
Whatever lacunae regarding enforcement this may lead to, the
situation has been remedied somewhat by developments in the field of
human rights and recognition of crimes against humanity, which must not
be confused with breaches of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
or either of the two Covenants, none of which imposes an enforceable
24. Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed
Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 31; Convention for the Amelioration of the
Condition of the Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of the Armed Forces at Sea, Aug.

12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 85; Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12,
1949, 75 U.N.T.S 135; Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of
War, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 287.
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obligation upon the parties. However, constant reiteration in United
Nations documents, together with assertions of their significance by both
writers and states, as well as reference to them in World Court judgments,
leads to the conclusion that these amount to opinio juris ac necessitatis and
constitute either customary international law or general principles of law
recognized by civilized nations.75
More important than any of these documents is the concept of
crimes against humanity. This was first postulated as black letter law in
the London Charter establishing the International Military Tribunal for the
Prosecution of the Major War Criminals of the European Axis at
Nuremberg. 26 While it is true that this was formulated 2 for the purposes of
the Tribunal and to deal with such offenses as had been committed during
the Holocaust and the Nazi occupation of Europe, the concept has been
greatly widened. There is much to be said in favor of adopting the view
expressed in its Interim Reportn by the Commission of Experts appointed
by the Security Council to investigate the alleged atrocities committed
during the civil war in Rwanda.
If the normative content of "crimes against humanity" had
remained frozen in its Nuremberg form, then it could not
possibly apply to the situation in Rwanda that existed .. .
because there was not a "war" in the classic sense of an
29
inter-state or international armed conflict.
However, the normative content of "crimes against
humanity" - originally employed by the Nuremberg
Tribunal for its own specific purposes in connection with
the Second World War - has undergone substantial
evolution since the end of the Second World War.30
"[C]rimes against humanity" as a normative concept finds
its very origins in "principles of humanity" first invoked in
the early 1800s by a state to denounce another state's
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human rights violations of its own citizens.,, Thus,
"crimes against humanity as a juridical category was
conceived early on to apply to individuals regardless as to
whether or not the criminal act was perpetrated during a
state of armed conflict or not and regardless of the
32
nationality of the perpetrator or victim.
Secondly, the content and legal status of the norm since
Nuremberg has been broadened and expanded through
certain international instruments adopted by the United
Nations since 1945.
In particular, the Genocide
Convention of 1948 affirms the legal validity of some of
the normative content of "crimes against humanity" as
conceived in article 6 (c) of the Nuremberg Charter, but
does not overtake it. The International Convention on the
Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid33 .
refers in article 1 to apartheid as a "crime against
humanity. "-1
Thirdly, the Commission of Experts on [crimes in] the
former Yugoslavia . . . has stated 3 that it considered
crimes against humanity to be:
"gross violations of
fundamental rules of humanitarian and human rights law
committed by persons demonstrably linked to a party to
the conflict, as part of an official policy based on
discrimination against an identifiable group of persons,
irrespective of war and the nationality of the victim." This
view finds support in the writings of publicists.

31. See, e.g., Green, InternationalLaw and the Control of Barbarism, in Macdonald et al.,
The Role of Law in the InternationalBehavior, 17 ISRAEL Y.B. HUM. RTS. 149 (1987).
32. Id. at para. 115.
33. The International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of
Apartheid, 1973, 13 I.L.M. 50. It should be noted that not all the major powers have ratified
this instrument.
34.

S.C. Doc. S/1994/1125, Oct. 4, 1994 at para. 116.

35. This quotation seems to have been take from the Interim Report since this wording
does not appear in the Commission's Final Report, U.N. SCDOC.S/1994/674 (1994), but it
forms a summary of paragraphs 84-6 of that Report.
36. S.C. Doc. S/1994/1125, Oct. 4, 1994 at para. 117.
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Although there is a tendency among them to consider that many of the
crimes against humanity committed in a non-international conflict do not
37
need to be discriminatory and directed at any particular group.
The Commission of Experts on Rwanda [likewise]
considers that "crimes against humanity" are gross
violations of fundamental rules of humanitarian and human
rights law committed by persons demonstrably linked to a
party to the conflict, as part of an official policy based on
discrimination against an identifiable group of persons
irrespective of war and the nationality of the victim .... 38
By this reiteration of the concept of discrimination, the two
Commissions seem to have made it clear that genocide, which is
essentially a discriminatory offense, is in fact a crime against humanity
hardly a necessary undertaking. The philosophy required to bring the
concept of crimes against humanity into line with current thought cannot
be argued with, in which case, provided the necessary tribunal exists,
there would be little difficulty in asserting that such crimes committed
during non-international conflicts are amenable to criminal prosecution.
Since it is generally accepted that war crimes are subject to universal
jurisdiction and there is a somewhat similar approach developing, if not
already existing, with regard to crimes against humanity, it would lead to
the conclusion that such offenses can be tried in any state in which an
offender is found. The two ad hoc tribunals established in connection with
crimes in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda enjoy concurrent jurisdiction
with such national tribunals, although the latter must give way to the
claims of the former should these be lodged, as has. in fact already ensued
as between Germany and the Yugoslav tribunal and Tanzania and that for
Rwanda. In addition, a Spanish judge has ruled that the torture and
disappearance of Spanish nationals in Argentina during the dirty war in
that country, a clear non-international or low-intensity conflict, amount to
crimes against humanity grounding jurisdiction in Spain and imposing an
obligation on all countries to recognize any warrant for arrest issued in
respect of the alleged offenders. Moreover, a French court has sentenced
Captain Alfredo Astiz of the Argentine Navy to life imprisonment for
murdering two French nuns in 1977. However, the Argentine Under-

37. In fact, it was not the Tribunal which established the nature of crimes against
humanity, but the Charter setting up the Tribunal which resulted in this interpretation. The Role
of Law in Establishing Norms of International Behavior, in THE RULE OF LAW IN THE
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLICY OF HUMAN WELFARE 239 (1978).
38.
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Secretary for Human Rights has made it clear that the Argentine
Government will not cooperate in any way in regard to allegations against
any Argentine subject charged with offenses during this particular lowintensity conflict, since "a foreign court has no jurisdiction over events
that took place on Argentine soil. 39 This does not mean, however, that
any state in which such Argentine citizens may be found is prevented from
recognizing the validity of an attempt by an accusing state to obtain the
extradition of such accused by giving effect to such an international
warrant or proceed to try the accused itself by exercising universal
jurisdiction in respect of alleged crimes against humanity.
The most important developments in the law concerning noninternational conflicts were effected by the 1977 Protocols annexed to the
1949 Geneva Conventions.40 Protocol I introduces a most fundamental
change in the law of armed conflict. So long as an internal conflict is
directed towards self-government, the Protocol provides for its recognition
as an international conflict governed by the Conventions and the Protocol,
as well as the ordinary law regarding international armed conflicts. By
article 1(4), an armed conflict includes one:
in which peoples are fighting against colonial domination
and alien occupation and against racist regimes in the
exercise of their right of self-determination as enshrined in
the Charter of the United Nations4' and the Declaration on
Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly
Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance
with the Charter of the United Nations.42
However, in the practice of the United Nations not all conflicts in
which one of the parties claims to be seeking self-determination fall within
the framework of this provision. To qualify as a national liberation
movement so engaged, the entity making the claim must be recognized as
such by the regional organization in the area in which it is operating. This
would exclude the various guerrilla movements of Latin America, none of
39.

Marlise Simons, Unforgiving Spain Pursues Argentine Killers, N.Y. Times, Oct. 24,

1996, at Al.
40. Protocols Additional to the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949 Relating to the
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, opened for signature Dec. 12, 1977,
1125 U.N.T.S. 3, 16 I.L.M. 1391 (1977) [hereinafter Geneva Convention].. Schindler and

Toman, supra note 7, at 621, 689.
41.
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42.
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which is recognized by the Organization of American States, and which
movements in any case are revolutionary groups seeking to replace the
local government rather than to overthrow domination, alien occupation or
a racist regime. Equally, the Irish Republican Army, though it claims to
be seeking self-determination from alien occupation, is not so recognized
by either the Council of Europe or the North Atlantic Treaty Organization,
the members of which regard the movement as being terrorist.
The same denial is extended to, for example, the struggle by the
people of Chechniya seeking to break away from Russia; the various
Kurdish groups trying by force of arms to separate from their various
rulers; or the Sikhs aiming to establish a State of Kalistan distinct from
India. Each of these claims to be fighting for self-determination, but none
of them is accepted as a national liberation movement, nor regarded as
falling within the scope of article 1(4) of Protocol I.
Moreover, the Protocol and the Conventions do not come into
4
force automatically as they do with an international armed conflicts.
Instead, by article 96(3) of the Protocol the authority representing the
"people engaged against a High Contracting Party" must make a unilateral
declaration of adhesion and compliance, sent to the Swiss government as
depositary, undertaking to apply the Conventions and the Protocol during
the conflict. While this entails:
the Conventions and the Protocol [being] brought into
force for the said authority as a Party to the conflict with
immediate effect [with that] authority assum[ing] the same
rights and obligations as those which have been assumed
by a High Contracting Party ... and the Conventions and
Protocol [becoming] equally binding upon all the Parties to
the conflict"
the Protocol is silent as to the position if the governing authority has failed
to ratify the Protocol or refuses to consider the national liberation
movement as anything but a band of traitors. Moreover, its right to do so
seems to be confirmed by article 4 of the Protocol for "the application of
the Conventions and of the Protocol ... shall not affect the legal status of
the Parties to the conflict ... "
However, both parties would still be bound by the minimum
conditions of humanitarian law, leaving it open, should that possibility
arise, for the partisans of either to be tried for genocide or crimes against

43. Geneva Conventions, supra note 40, art. 3(1).
44.

Protocol I, supra note 33, at art. 96.
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humanity, especially in the light of the widened interpretation given to the
concept of crimes against humanity already mentioned.
Should all the requirements in article 96 be satisfied, with the
governing authority equally bound, both the national liberation movement
and its opponent would become subject to all the provisions of the
Conventions and Protocol including those relating to grave breaches. In
addition, since such a conflict is now regarded as equivalent to an
international armed conflict the laws and regulations, both customary and
conventional, governing such a conflict would be operative, thus
subjecting the members of both antagonists to any prosecution and
punishment for war crimes that they might commit, including those
relating to command responsibility or superior orders.
At present, with the vastly reduced number of colonial territories
awaiting liberation, there are few areas which may be truly regarded as
satisfying the conditions of article 1(4) with regard to self-determination.
In the future, there is likely to be a proliferation of situations which were
formerly regarded as civil wars or revolutions, thus reducing the possible
significance of article 1(4), and the fact that the revolutionary authority
describes itself as a national liberation movement seeking selfdetermination does not alter the legal position in any way.
To some extent, this type of situation is covered by Protocol II,
which seeks to extend that part of humanitarian law which serves to protect
non-combatants - a need that, in view of the ideological hatreds often
aroused in such a conflict, is often more important in a non-international
than an international armed conflict. But, acknowledging that internal
order is a matter of domestic jurisdiction, the scope of Protocol II is
somewhat limited. In the first place, the Protocol does not apply "to
situations of internal disturbances and tensions, such as riots, isolated and
sporadic acts of violence, and other acts of a similar nature, as not being
armed conflicts,""5 even though the armed forces whether regular or in the
form of some national guard are needed to suppress them and restore
Second, the threshold for operation of the
governmental authority.
Protocol is even higher than that required to bring article 1(4) of Protocol I
into operation. For Protocol II to apply, the conflict must be between
governmental armed forces "and dissident armed forces or other organized
groups which, under responsible command, exercise such control over a
part of its territory as to enable them to carry out sustained and concerted
military operations and to implement this Protocol." 46

45. Protocol II, supra note 40, at art. 1(2).
46.

Protocol I, supra note 40, at art. 1(1).
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Protocol I does not require that the national liberation movement
waging its war for self-determination be in control of any part of the
national territory. It would suffice if all operations are directed from
outside such territory so long as the conditions of article 96 are complied
with. For Protocol II, however, the threshold is such that the Protocol
cannot really come into operation until the conflict takes on the form of a
civil war somewhat similar to that waged in Spain between the Republican
government and the Nationalist authorities. For the dissidents merely to
declare no go areas, as the Irish Republican Army tends to do, is
insufficient.
Another failing of the Protocol is that it prescribes no method for
its implementation and is silent on enforcement.
Nor is there any
provision as to breaches or their punishment, nor even to any obligation
upon a governing authority to take steps to ensure that the humanitarian
principles embodied therein are observed. Presumably, however, the
reference in the article to the dissidents being under responsible command
suggests that, to the extent that any liability might arise, some measure of
command responsibility does in fact exist. While Protocol I calls upon the
parties to disseminate and educate both the military and civilian
populations, 7 article 19 of Protocol II merely states "[t]his Protocol shall
be disseminated as widely as possible." In fact, when at Geneva during
the drafting of the Protocol it was suggested that there should be a
provision similar to that in Protocol I, the representative of one South
American country, where revolutionary activity has not been rare, made it
clear that there was no way his government would agree to any suggestion
that it was obliged to inform its population as to what its rights might be in
the event of an attempt by that population to resort to force aimed at the
overthrow of the government.
To some extent this view finds some support in article 3 of the
Protocol, a provision relating to state sovereignty which is somewhat wider
than that to be found in Protocol I:
1. Nothing in this Protocol shall be invoked for the
purpose of affecting the sovereignty of a State or the
responsibility of the government, by all legitimate means,
to maintain or re-establish law and order in the State or to
defend the national unity and territorial integrity of the
State.

47. Id. at art. 83.
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2.
Nothing in this Protocol shall be invoked as a
justification for intervening, directly or indirectly, for any
reason whatever, in the armed conflict or in the internal or
external affairs of the High Contracting Party in the
territory of which that conflict occurs. 8
There is no indication in the Protocol as to what is meant by all
legitimate means open to the governing authority to maintain its position.
Since silence cannot be construed as imposing any limitation on a
sovereign's freedom of action,' 9 this leaves it open to that authority to
apply any means, under its national law - and this is traditionally not open
to third party criticism - which it may consider necessary to achieve its
purpose.
Further, since the Protocol is an international instrument
between states, it only confers rights upon the parties thereto. If a party to
the Protocol involved in a non-international conflict were to ignore the
provisions of Protocol II, the only rights arising in respect of that breach
are the normal rights attending a breach of treaty, and, as the World Court
has indicated, while a state may have the competence to bring an action, it
can only succeed if it has itself suffered damage as a result of the breach.1
Virtually all states in the modern world are parties to human rights
instruments or have declared adherence to the principles embodied in such
documents, and there has been constant reiteration of their significance in
resolutions adopted by both the General Assembly and the Security
Council, as well as other international organs, sufficient to maintain that
these principles now amount to customary law and perhaps even jus
cogens.5' This means that, regardless of any obligations that might arise
from Protocol II, there are certain obligations binding upon the parties
engaged in a non-international conflict. Further, since the Protocol is
additional to the 1949 Conventions, to which almost all states are party,
the minimum rights embodied in article 3 of those agreements operate
whatever be the position concerning Protocol II. Finally, it should be
borne in mind that much of Protocol II is little more than a reaffirmation of
the basic principles of humanitarian law binding on all states, military
authorities, and civilian populations, breach of which would in many
instances amount to crimes against humanity.
When they do, all
offenders, regardless of rank, status, or nationality, become amenable to
48.

Protocol II, supra note 33, at art. 3.

49. See, e.g., S.S.Lotus, 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No.10; Hudson, 1934 WORLD COURT
REPORTS 1, 163.
50.

South West Africa Cases (Second Phase), 1966 I.C.J. 6.
51. See, e.g., THEODOR MERON, HUMAN RIGHTS AND HUMANITARIAN
CUSTOMARY LAW (1989).
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trial by any state in the territory of which they may be found, and this is
especially so in the light of the extended interpretation now being given to
crimes against humanity.
In addition to the means of enforcing the law in non-international
or low-intensity conflicts outlined here, there is always the overriding
power of the Security Council to declare that a particular situation amounts
to a threat to the peace, a breach of the peace, or an act of aggression
calling for enforcement action under chapter VII of the Charter and
overriding the normal reservation regarding domestic jurisdiction
embodied in article 2(7) of the Charter, as may well result from the
presence of alien volunteers intervening on behalf of either the government
or the dissidents. In this regard it should be noted that there is no effective
way in which the Security Council may be held to have exceeded its
competence. 2 Moreover, in view of the new significance accorded to
respect for human rights there is strong ground for believing that such
intervention might be tolerated internationally, as it has been in some parts
of the African continent. It has even been suggested that there might be
created a standing army of African soldiers to intervene to protect civilians
threatened by the collapse of a local nation state, and where civilian
casualties are likely to be extremely high.5 3 Such a force "would not be
allowed to take sides, but would set up safe areas where civilians could be
protected. "14 However, the establishment of such a safe area and
protection of the civilians therein - hopefully more effectively than was
the case in Bosnia - would almost certainly be regarded by one of the
parties to the conflict as taking sides. Such intervention could be defended
on the ground that it did not impinge upon article 2(4) of the Charter, since
there was, theoretically at least, no threat to the territorial integrity or
political independence of the state concerned. It would nevertheless
appear that moving in because of the collapse of a nation state was in fact
a denial, however temporary, of its political independence. Determination
as to whether this is in fact so, however, would be by decision of the
Security Council, which would probably decide that, in view of the
significance of human rights, the intervention was clearly consistent with
the purposes of the United Nations, which include "respect for the
principle of equal rights and self determination of peoples," 5 the
52. See, e.g., Lockerbie Aerial Incident (Libyan Arab-Jamahirya v. U.K.), 1992 I.C.J. 3,
15; see also, id. at 114, for a similar Order re Libyan request against United States.
53. See infra remarks concerning possible assumption of power on behalf of the United
Nations.
54. THE TIMES (London), 1 Sept. 1996.
55.

U.N. CHARTER art. 1, para. 2.
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intervention having been directed to protecting the equal rights of the
civilian population and to enable the entire people to exercise its right to
self determination by way of a more acceptable administration.
In the course of its fifty years of existence the United Nations has
on a number of occasions made use of national contingents provided by
members to act as peacekeepers or interposition forces aimed at keeping
the contestants apart, but without any right to intervene, even in the event
of their witnessing acts which are clearly contrary to humanitarian law,
although this does not mean that local commanders or the states sending
them have not taken such an initiative, as the United States sought to do
without success in Somalia.
Most significant has been the reaction of the Security Council to
events consequent upon the break-up of the former Yugoslavia or
following the mysterious death of the President of Rwanda in an air crash.
After Yugoslavia broke up into a number of independent states,
conflict broke out between Serbia and Croatia, Serbia and Bosnia
Herzegovina and Croatia and Bosnia Herzegovina. While these conflicts
subsisted they were clearly international armed conflicts subject to the
rules pertaining thereto. In Bosnia Herzegovina, however, dissident
ethnic/national groups made up of local Serbs and Croats took up arms
against the largely Muslim Bosnian government seeking either to establish
an independent state of their own within Bosnian territory, or with the
intention of seceding and adhering to Serbia or Croatia as the case might
be. In addition, dissident Muslim groups also took up arms against the
Bosnian government. These conflicts were clearly non-international, even
though many of the officers involved had been officers in the former
Yugoslav Army and in the earlier stages at least had received support and
arms from the Croatian and particularly Serbian governments. While such
assistance subsisted it might have been difficult to determine which
breaches of the law were committed during an international conflict
constituting war crimes, and those perpetrated during a low-intensity
conflict, and which, though they might amount to genocide or crimes
against humanity, would not fall within the normal understanding of the
rubric war crimes. When assistance from Croatia and Serbia ended, the
The situation
conflicts reverted to their status as non-international.
remained under some measure of legal control however, since the
government of the former Yugoslavia had ratified the Geneva Conventions
and .the two Protocols and the governments of Croatia and Bosnia had
announced their adherence thereto. To that extent, therefore, the conflicts
were subject to those instruments, fully in the case of the international
conflicts involved and, to the extent already analyzed, to the noninternational conflicts in Bosnia as well.
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In so far as Rwanda is concerned, there were no similar problems
of classification. There it was a simple case of the larger ethnic group, the
Tsutsis, taking up arms against the ruling minority ethnic group, the
Hutus. During this conflict extensive atrocities were committed, especially
by forces and officials owing allegiance to the overthrown Hutu
administration.
In Bosnia Herzegovina the warring parties, and particularly the
Serbs, pursued a policy of ethnic cleansing involving the expulsion of nonSerbs from their homes and from territory under Serb control. Many of
the expelees died from starvation and exposure, while there was evidence
that massacres on a fairly large scale were being perpetrated against
expelled Muslims as a matter of policy. Even if the deaths are ignored, it
is difficult to deny that such a policy would cause, in the terminology of
the Genocide Convention, "serious bodily or mental harm to members of
the group[s]" affected. Similarly, in Rwanda extensive massacres of
Tstutsis by Hutus, and vice versa, ensued, including raids on refugee
camps in neighboring countries. Such offenses were, in accordance with
the terminology of the Genocide Convention, to be tried by the authorities
of the territories in which the offenses were committed. Any such trials,
however, were more likely to be based on a demand for vengeance than a
pursuit of justice." If such acts of vengeance were to be avoided or
minimized, some means of establishing an international criminal tribunal
would have to be resorted to.
Acting on instructions from the Security Council, the Secretary
General of the United Nations established two Commissions of Inquiry to
seek out evidence of genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity
committed in both the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, and, in the light of
their reports, he proposed to the Council that international ad hoc tribunals
be established to try offenders and submitted a draft statute for each of two
distinct bodies. A problem soon arose concerning the competence of the
Security Council to establish such a court since the Charter is silent on the
matter. This issue of jurisdiction was raised in the case of Dusko Tadic5
the first to be charged before the Yugoslav tribunal. In the course of its
rejection of the plea, the Appeal Chamber, having ruled that the Council
would certainly have been able to establish such a tribunal to deal with
issues arising from an international conflict as being in breach of or
threatening the peace,8 continued:

56. In fact, Rwanda announced its intention to bring thousands of Hutu to trial.
57. The Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic, 1995, 35 I.L.M. 32.
58. Id., para. 30.
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But even if it were considered merely as an 'internal
armed conflict', it would still constitute a 'threat to the
peace' according to the settled practice of the Security
Council [the constitutionality of which it was beyond the
competence of the Tribunal to question] and the common
understanding of the United Nations membership in
general. Indeed, the practice of the Security Council is
rich with cases of civil or internal strife which it classified
as a 'threat to the peace' and dealt with under Chapter VII,
with the encouragement or even at the behest of the
General Assembly, such as the Congo crisis at the
beginning of the 1960s and, more recently, Liberia and
Somalia. It can thus be said that there is a common
understanding, manifested by the 'subsequent practice' of
the membership of the United Nations at large, that the
'threat to the peace' of Article 39 may include, as one of
its species, internal armed conflicts .... 9
Here we have an instance of a specially created tribunal deciding
that the organ of the United Nations establishing it possesses a power not
apparent from the text of the Charter by construing the acquiescence of the
membership as equivalent to opiniojuris ac necessitatis, and perhaps even
constituting a de facto amendment of the Charter itself. The Chamber then
proceeded to find that the establishment of the Tribunal is fully within the
competence of the Council, since it:
matches perfectly the description in Article 41 of
'measures not involving the use of force.' The measures
set out in [that] Article are merely illustrative exampleswl
which obviously do not exclude other measures. All the
Article requires is that they do not involve 'the use of
force.' It is a negative definition . . . . Logically, if the
organization can undertake measures which have to be
implemented through the intermediary of its Members, it
can a fortiori undertake measures which it can implement
directly via its organs, if it happens to have the resources
to do so. It is only for want of such resources that the
United Nations has to act through its Members. But it is
of the essence of 'collective measures' that they are
collectively undertaken. Action by Member States on
59 Id.
60. Id. (italics in original).
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behalf of the Organization is but a poor substitute faute de
mieux, or a 'second best' for want of the first. This is also
the pattern of Article 42 on measures involving the flse of
armed force.
In sum, the establishment of the
International Military Tribunal falls squarely within the
powers of the Security Council under Article 41 ....
The Security Council of the United Nations has resorted to
the establishment of a judicial organ in the form of an
international criminal tribunal as an instrument for the
exercise of its own principal function of maintenance of
international peace and security, i.e., as a measure
contributing to the restoration of peace in the former
Yugoslavia . . . . Article 39 leaves the choice of means
and their evaluation to the Security Council, which enjoys
wide discretionary powers in this regard, and it could not
have been otherwise, as such a choice involves political
evaluation of highly complex and dynamic situations ....
[T]he Appeals Chamber considers that the International
Tribunal has been lawfully established as a measure under
61
Chapter VII of the Charter.
This may be considered a somewhat extensive interpretation of the
powers of the Security Council since there is nothing in the Charter to
indicate any likelihood of the Council establishing a court additional to the
International Court of Justice, although it may perhaps be contended that
since the Charter describes the Court as the "principal judicial organ of the
United Nations," 62 it leaves the way open for further tribunals to be set up.
But the World Court is a civil tribunal and there is nothing in the Charter
indicating a competence to establish criminal courts. Moreover, to
establish such a court is inconsistent with the traditional attitude of states
which has not been excessively favorable to the establishment of a tribunal
having jurisdiction to try governmental leaders and hold them personally
responsible for what may be claimed to be the illegal activities of the states
they administer.
It was also claimed that the Tribunal was not properly set up since
it was not established by law. The Appeal Chamber rejected this
contention, holding that:
The important consideration in determining whether a
tribunal has been 'established by law' is not whether it was
61.

Id. at paras. 32-40.

62

U.N. CHARTER art. 92.
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pre-established or established for a specific purpose or
situation; what is important is that it be set up by a
competent organ in keeping with the relevant legal
procedure, and that it observes the requirements of
procedural fairness .... 6
This suggests that if a revolutionary authority which had not yet
created a proper legislative body established a tribunal by executive decree
with the sole object of trying the president and other members of the
overthrown administration, such a tribunal would be considered as
established by law, provided it conducted itself in accordance with
acknowledged principles of justice. We might question here, therefore,
2
whether the tribunal established in Angola for the trial of mercenaries
would be considered one established by law. Similarly, did the tribunal
envisage by article 227 of the Treaty of Versailless- to try Wilhelm II
satisfy all these conditions since it was implied that the mere constitution of
the tribunal would assure "him the guarantees essential to the right of
defense . . . [and as iun its decision the tribunal will be guided by the
highest motives of international policy, with a view to vindicating the
solemnity of international undertakings and the validity of international
morality[?]"
It is not really of major significance from the point of view of the
relevance of law to low-intensity or other non-international conflicts
whether one accepts the Tribunal's interpretation of Chapter VII of the
Charter and the competence of the Security Council thereunder. The
General Assembly has confirmed the existence of both tribunals and no
member of the United Nations has contested this. Some, in fact, have
already given effect to the obligation embodied in the relevant statute"
recognizing that, while there is concurrent jurisdiction as between the
Tribunal and national courts, the former enjoys primacy. Thus, although
German law grants jurisdiction to German courts to try those found on
German soil who may be accused of crimes against humanity, German law
was amended so that Tadic was surrendered to stand trial before the
Tribunal at The Hague. Similarly, Tanzania extradited Akeyasu so that he
might be tried by the Rwanda Tribunal.

63. Para. 45 "to Tadic case."
64. See, e.g., Green, The Status of Mercenaries in InternationalLaw, in ESSAYS ON THE
MODERN LAW OF WAR ch. 9 (1985); Lockwood, Report on the Trial of Mercenaries, 7
MANITOBA L.J. 183 (1972).

65. Treaty of Versailles, 225 Consol. Treaty Series 189 (1919).
66. Statute of the Yugoslavia Tribunal art. 9 (2); Statute of Rwanda Tribunal art. 8 (2).
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The various jurisdictional problems concerning the Yugoslav
Tribunal did not arise in relation to the Tribunal for Rwanda for there was
never any doubt that the conflict on that territory was anything but noninternational.
Moreover, the Rwanda Tribunal was not granted
jurisdiction to try offenses against the laws and customs of war.
As to substantive issues of jurisdiction, the Yugoslav Tribunal has
jurisdiction over violations of the laws and customs of war, genocide, and
crimes against humanity. Its competence concerning the laws and customs
of war relates to incidents perpetrated during the international conflicts
occurring in the former Yugoslavia.
The Statute of the Yugoslav Tribunal indicates that violations of
the laws and customs of war
shall include, but not be limited to:
(a) employment of poisonous weapons or other weapons
calculated to cause unnecessary suffering;
(b) wanton destruction of cities, town or villages, or
devastation not justified by military necessity;
(c) attack or bombardment, by whatever means, of
undefended towns, villages, dwellings, or buildings;
(d) seizure of, destruction or willful damage done to
institutions dedicated to religion, charity and education; the
arts and sciences, historic monuments and works of art and
science;
(e) plunder of public or private property.67
Except for the last two items, it is submitted that this enumeration,
together with other unspecified breaches of the laws and customs of war,
in fact constitute crimes against humanity. It may be suggested, therefore,
that it would perhaps have been better had the Statute not referred to this
collection of offenses in any way. Had this been the case, many of the
jurisdictional issues relating to the Yugoslav Tribunal might have been
averted, for, in the light of the new attitude to crimes against humanity,
there is little doubt that these crimes would now be regarded as subject to
universal jurisdiction.

67.

Statute of the Yugoslavia Tribunal, art. 3.
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As to genocide, although the Convention provides for local
jurisdiction pending the establishment of an international tribunal
possessing jurisdiction over this offense, the international tribunals, though
ad hoc and created for a limited purpose, satisfy this requirement. It may
also be argued that genocide is in fact the gravest of all crimes against
humanity and, therefore, it might have been as well that the Tribunals
should simply have been endowed with jurisdiction over crimes against
humanity and nothing else. However, in view of the universal horror
resulting from the ethnic cleansing that took place in the former
6
Yugoslavia and the openly inter-tribal massacres perpetrated in Rwanda, 1
it was probably considered useful to indicate that genocide was so
horrendous a crime as to warrant specific condemnation, rather than
simply to include it in the generality of crimes against humanity.
Both Statutes, confirming the accepted practice with regard to
crimes against international law, particularly those committed during
conflict, confirmed that the status of an accused would not provide
immunity 9 and that individual responsibility would attach to anyone
planning, instigating, ordering, or aiding and abetting in the planning or
preparation of crimes within the tribunal's jurisdiction, as well as to any
superior who knew or had reason to know that a subordinate was about to
commit any crime within the tribunal's jurisdiction and who failed to take
the necessary and reasonable measures to prevent such acts or punish the
perpetrators, while at the same time it was made clear that superior orders
could not be pleaded by way of defense.o
The issue of competence in the case of the Yugoslav Tribunal with
regard to crimes against humanity was really beyond question, once it was
decided that the Security Council could establish it. The tribunal had no
option but to try those charged with such crimes committed in the former
Yugoslavia during those conflicts which were non-international, for article
5 of the Statute expressly conferred such jurisdiction over crimes against
humanity "when committed in armed conflict, whether international or
internal in character, and directed against the civilian population." As
regards its general competence, article 1 provided that it "shall have the
power to prosecute persons responsible for serious violations of

68. During the trial for genocide of Jean-Marie Akayesu, defense counsel cited the killing
of at least one million, the prosecution claimed that 800,000 of these were Tsutsis, while the
defense contended that "800,000 Hutus and 200,000 moderate Tsutsis have been killed in the
1994 massacres rather than the other way around." THE TIMES (London), Sept. 1, 1996, at 27.

69. Statute of the Yugoslavia Tribunal art. 7 (2); Statute of the Rwanda Tribunal art. 6 (2).
70. Statute of the Yugoslavia Tribunal, art. 7(1), (3), (4); Statute of the Rwanda Tribunal,
art. 6 (1), (3), (4).
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international humanitarian law committed in the former Yugoslavia since
1991 . . ." and international humanitarian law includes grave breaches of
the Geneva Conventions and Protocol I, war crimes in the traditional
sense, genocide, and crimes against humanity.
Many of the persons indicted by the Yugoslav Tribunal, including
Tadic, Radic, Mladic, and Karadzic were charged with offenses which
involved both personal as well as command responsibility. Among the
charges leveled against Mladic and Karadzic were genocide, crimes
against humanity, unlawful confinement of civilians and destruction of
sacred sites, as well as unlawful shelling of civilian cities, including
Sarajevo, together with seizure of a number of United Nations
peacekeepers and holding them as hostages. The crime of genocide can
not really be committed by a single individual acting alone, even though he
may be committing his offenses in accordance with his own discriminatory
prejudices. Nor is it likely to be initiated by a person holding inferior
rank, for it is a question of executive or command decision on a highly
sensitive policy issue. The same is true of any decision to seize and hold
hostage United Nations personnel.
The first person to appear for trial before the Rwanda Tribunal
Jean-Marie Akeyasu, was similarly charged with offenses involving
personal and command responsibility. As the former mayor of Taba, he
was charged with genocide, murder, and crimes against humanity arising
from the massacre of local Tsustis, including the killing and mutilation of
pregnant women. Overall, he was charged with prime responsibility for
what had happened. 71
Even if we ignore the existence of the two specially created
tribunals, it may probably be said that it is now well established that
crimes committed during a low-intensity or non-international armed
conflict which amount to crimes against humanity are, like war crimes
committed in an international conflict, subject to universal jurisdiction,
amenable to trial in any country wherein the offender may be found.
In so far as either of the tribunals has authorized issue of an
Indictment, that Indictment is universally valid and the named accused is
liable to arrest wherever he may be found and then handed over to the
tribunal for trial, 72 even though the members of the Implementation Force
in Bosnia appear unwilling to recognize the validity of such an instrument.
It is thus, at least theoretically, impossible for anyone so indicted to claim
asylum.
71.

N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 27, 1996.

72.

Statute of the Yugoslavia Tribunal, arts. 19(2) & 29; Statute of the Rwanda Tribunal,

arts. 18(2) & 28..
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Equally significant with regard to the applicability of universal
jurisdiction in respect of crimes against humanity committed during a noninternational conflict has been the decision of Judge Baltazar Garzon in
Madrid. An allegation was brought by a Spanish woman alleging that her
husband and two sons were tortured and disappearedduring the dirty war
in Argentina. Judge Garzon ruled that, regardless of the Argentine
amnesty concerning such offenses and which, in any case, enjoyed no
validity in Spain, he possessed jurisdiction over cases of torture and
murder committed against Spanish citizens in Argentina during the period
of civil disturbance. In his view, these acts amounted to crimes against
humanity which were subject to universal jurisdiction, so that any warrant
he might issue would be entitled to international recognition and
enforceable universally. Similarly, in relation to the same low-intensity
conflict in Argentina, France has sentenced Captain Alfredo Astiz of the
Argentine Navy to life imprisonment for the unlawful killing of two
French nuns in 1977. It must be noted, however, that Argentina's UnderSecretary for Human Rights has made it clear that the Argentine
Government will not cooperate in any way with such proceedings, since "a
foreign court has no jurisdiction over events that took place on Argentine
soil."1 3 But this does not mean that any person named by a state as
responsible for criminal activities amounting to crimes against humanity
during Argentina's dirty war and found outside Argentina will not be
handed over to a demanding country by the host state.
As to genocide as defined by the Convention, the lacuna
concerning jurisdiction may be filled by acknowledging that genocide is a
crime against humanity and so, regardless of the Convention
nomenclature, 74 clearly subject to universal jurisdiction.
Where war crimes are concerned, in a mixed situation involving
both international and non-international conflicts, it may well be advisable
to ignore these completely and lodge charges in accordance with the law
concerning crimes against humanity, into which category at least the more
serious war crimes would fall, and, if desired, to charge with genocide as
well. In this way, any dispute concerning the applicability of the law of
war with regard to any aspect of the conflict would be avoided, while at
the same time ensuring that any crimes which might in the course of the

73.

N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 24, 1996.

74. In the case of State of Israel v. Eichmann, 36 I.L.R. 5 (1961/2)., the Israeli authorities
did not prosecute him for genocide as such, since the Convention, with its international
definition, was adopted after he had committed his crimes. Instead he was charged with a series
of crimes which amounted to genocide in the ordinary meaning of that term as generally

understood by the time of the trial.
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international conflict amount to war crimes or grave breaches will in
relation to the non-international conflict be equally subject to trial.
From an extra-judicial point of view other means exist for ensuring
enforcement of the law in a non-international conflict. In the first place, it
is open to the Security Council to decide, as it has done in establishing the
tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, that the conflict
constitutes a breach of the peace or a threat thereto, requiring enforcement
action under chapter VII. In addition, events in Iraq following the 1991
Gulf War between that country and the Coalition forces, as well as in
Bosnia, demonstrate that, when circumstances relating to a continuance of
hostilities or denial of human rights are involved, the world community, or
groups of states acting on their own or in the name of an international
organization may decide that, for humanitarian reasons, it has become
necessary to resort to measures which would normally, or under a narrow
interpretation of the domestic jurisdiction reservation in article 2,
paragraph 7, or the injunctions in article 2, paragraph 4, of the Charter5
be condemned as unwarranted intervention.
In Iraq no-fly zones were established to protect the Kurdish
minority from abuse by the Iraqi government against which it was waging
a conflict directed at securing independence. When the various Kurdish
groups fought as between themselves, and one requested aid from the Iraqi
government which aid was given, the United States, claiming to be
enforcing protection of the Kurds in accordance with Security Council
resolutions relating to the earlier invasion of Kuwait, protection of the
civilian population and the restoration and preservation of peace in the
area, unilaterally extended the no-fly area and attacked military
installations in southern Iraq, even though the operations affecting the
Kurds were taking place in the northern parts of the country.
Where Bosnia Herzegovina was concerned, an attempt was made
to stop the fighting and prepare the way for the establishment of an elected
government through the medium of arrangements set out in the General
Framework Agreement for Peace drawn up in Paris in 1995.6 The United
Nations peace-keeping force in the country was replaced by an
Implementation Force (IFOR) deployed under NATO (North Atlantic
Treaty Organization) auspices.
The Force's remit was to ensure
compliance with the cease-fire by all parties and supervise the election of a

75. "All Members shall refrain in their international relations form the use of force against
the territorial integrity or political independence of any state or in any other manner inconsistent
with the purposes of the United Nations."
76. Bosnia & Herzegovina-Croatia-Yugoslavia: General Framework Agreement for Peace
in Bosnia & Herzegovina with Annexes, Jan., 1996, 35 I.L.M. 75.
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democratic administration representing the various interests.
The
contingents making up IFOR were not authorized to intervene on behalf of
the various ethnic groups, even against violence committed in their
presence, although some local commanders acting on their own initiative
did resort to protective intervention measures. Most significant, however,
was the fact that the IFOR command interpreted their task under the Paris
Agreement as precluding IFOR members from arresting persons who had
been indicted by the ad. hoc tribunal for the former Yugoslavia," such
persons had been accidentally come upon, as in fact happened in the case
of one intelligence officer who had been entrapped by altered road signs
which diverted him from a route described as safe. He was sent to The
Hague, but the charges against him were dropped. Some of the persons
against whom indictments have been issued have participated in
discussions with IFOR representatives concerning the application of the
Paris Agreement, but this has not been considered sufficient to warrant
their being arrested, despite the issuance by the Tribunal of internationally
valid warrants. 8
It is submitted that there is enough legal authority to enforce the
law in non-international conflicts without having recourse to any specially
created tribunals. Since virtually all the breaches committed during such a
conflict amount to crimes against humanity and frequently include
genocide, there is sufficient evidence to support the contention that all such
offenses are subject to universal jurisdiction, so that offenders may be tried
by any country in which they may be found. This is not to suggest that the
jurisprudence of the two ad hoc Tribunals which have been established is
insignificant. Their creation has been accepted by the world community,
and any problems that may have existed with regard to their
constitutionality or competence are no longer in point, for the findings in
regard thereto have equally been acquiesced in. If, therefore, any such
tribunal were established in the future, it may be accepted that no such
questions will be raised or given any weight.

77. See, e.g., case of an individual indicted by the international war crimes tribunal on
charges of gang rape and running a slave/brothel for Bosnia Serb soldiers walked into the office
of the U.N. police monitors to protest that he was being harassed by the Bosnian police, he was
given the standard complaint form to fill out. When he said he was especially upset because
while he routinely passed through NATO military checkpoints with no trouble, the Bosnian police
were trying to arrest him, he was told that his difficulty would be investigated. When
questioned, "senior officials of the U.N. police monitors said they felt no remorse at having
missed the chance to detain Mr. Stankovic, since it 'was up to his colleagues in the Serbian
police.'" N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9, 1996.
78. Both Karadzic and Mladic fall into this category.
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As regards the precedential value of any judgments delivered by
the tribunals, whether in regard to international, non-international, or other
low-intensity conflicts, these should be granted as much authoritative
consideration as the Judgment of the International Military Tribunal at
Nuremberg. Moreover, having been created by the United Nations, rather
than by a group of victorious combatants granting jurisdiction only over
named individuals, it might even be suggested that the decisions of these
tribunals, as coming from. a less biased court, should enjoy greater
authority than is given to Nuremberg.
Furthermore, the events in Iraq and Bosnia demonstrate that,
should humanitarian considerations warrant it, intervention on behalf of an
international organization or perhaps even by a leading power, may
become acceptable even in a non-international conflict. In this connection,
reference might also be made to the possible use of extensive interpretation
of chapter XII of the Charter, 9 the concomitant creation of a replacement
for the Trusteeship Council which, after all, was considered to have
replaced the Permanent Mandates Commission of the League systems,
although it is accepted that some other term than trusteeship would have to
be found. When the governmental system of a state has disintegrated to an
extent that it is no longer possible for the national authorities to protect the
inhabitants or itself resorts to measures which in the past would probably
have resulted in humanitarian intervention, it should be possible for the
United Nations to decide that the state authorities in question have lost the
competence to be considered a legitimate authority rendering it necessary
for the United Nations itself, or powers authorized by it, to take over the
administration of that state and supervise the re-establishment of a system
that will once again permit local authorities to perform the proper
functions of a government in so far as protection of its citizenry is
concerned. To be properly performed, this would require the United
Nations, despite its financial difficulties, to establish a core of
administrators, much as Protocol I, 1977, envisages regarding the
recruitment and training of qualified persons who may be required to act
on behalf of a Protecting Power,' trained to fulfill such tasks and
immediately available should their services be required.
The arguments set out above should be sufficient to indicate that
means now exist so that the law may be enforced in respect of offenses
committed during non-international and low-intensity conflicts as much as
it seeks to do in regard to international conflicts. Arguments based on the
79. International Trusteeship System.

80. See, e.g., the various rulings of the World Court with regard to South West Africa.
81. Protocol I, art. 6.
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traditional view that such non-international conflicts are within the
domestic jurisdiction and so outside the purview of international law have
lost their validity. This means that the silence of Protocol II regarding
both breaches and enforcement becomes irrelevant, and it can no longer be
maintained, at least if genocide or crimes against humanity are committed,
that these are matters within such jurisdiction and beyond the scope of
international legal concern.

